



THE PANKAJ KUMAR JHA  
CENTRE FOR SECURITY STUDIES

# DEFENCE WHITE PAPER PROJECT

SWEDISH DEFENCE  
COMMISSION'S REPORT  
2023

SANKALP WADHWANI

EDITOR'S NAME: DEVAGUPTAPU SAKSHI

## About the Author

**Sankalp Wadhvani** is a postgraduate student at the Jindal School of International Affairs.

## About the Pankaj Kumar Jha Centre for Security Studies

The Pankaj Kumar Jha Centre for Security Studies (PKJCSS) was established in 2020 as the Jindal School of International Affairs' first student-run research centre under the aegis of Prof Dr Pankaj K Jha. Researchers at PKJCSS – through in-depth analysis briefs and events, reports, policy briefs and print publications – explore both regional and thematic topics in the broader field of international security studies. The concept of international security has been expanded to reflect not merely the study of state security, but also include topics like ethnic, sectarian, and religious conflict; civil wars and state failure; cyber and space warfare; resource related security issues; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; defence economics and also the role of ethics or morality in the formulation of security policies. The complexity of these matters is what the Centre for Security Studies attempts to unfold. Please refer to [www.cssjsia.com](http://www.cssjsia.com) for further details, and follow the Centre's social media platforms for critical news and research updates:



[www.linkedin.com/company/jindal-centre-for-security-studies/](http://www.linkedin.com/company/jindal-centre-for-security-studies/)



[www.instagram.com/css\\_jsia/](http://www.instagram.com/css_jsia/)



[https://twitter.com/Css\\_Jsia](https://twitter.com/Css_Jsia)

Get in touch with us through email: [css@jgu.edu.in](mailto:css@jgu.edu.in)

## Important Disclaimer

All views expressed in this publication belong to the author and do not reflect the opinions or positions of the Centre for Security Studies. While researchers and editors at CSS strive towards any instances, CSS as an organisation does not take any responsibility for any instance of plagiarism committed by any authors. The onus to ensure plagiarism-free work lies with authors themselves.

**WD241102**

# Introduction

In the heart of the North, Sweden, once a bastion of peace with neutrality grace, is now faced with shadows that darken its space. Russia's fierce roar calls forth a new chapter, a demand for war. Sweden stands tall, with no alliances forged yet heeding the call. Sweden prepares and contemplates its fate with NATO on the horizon but still waits to guard its freedom. Sweden's defense white paper unfolds a vision and a strategy for peace and justice as the future unfolds.

Sweden has shown a shift in its policy, from being a neutral nation reducing tensions, supporting peacemaking between two blocs during the Cold War, and assisting African countries in achieving better conditions to now expressing enthusiasm to join the NATO alliance, breaking its tradition of neutrality.<sup>1</sup>

The global landscape is facing a challenge given Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There has been panic in Europe, and one of Europe's powerful partners - the U.S, has struggled to maintain order with its resources distributed across different conflict zones around the world. Specifically in the Middle East alongside Israel and in the Indo-Pacific alongside QUAD.<sup>2</sup> The current global landscape has resulted from tensions over the last ten years, with Russia's annexation of Crimea and China challenging the U.S. hegemony. Due to this challenging and evolving global order, Sweden has been forced to re-evaluate its defense and security architecture, which is highlighted in its 2023 Defense whitepaper.

The Swedish Defense white paper is broadly divided into eight sections. It concerns Sweden's security policy, its developments, and its assessment of Sweden's perspective on the global landscape. The paper has also highlighted sections on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China acting as a geopolitical challenger to the U.S. hegemony, and one on the rules-based global order discussing deteriorating European security architecture wherein Sweden holds a powerful position. Lastly, the paper dedicates a long section to Sweden and NATO, highlighting the willingness and compatibility between both. Overall, the defense white paper has been dominated by traditional

---

<sup>1</sup> Norrlof, C. (2024, April 2). *The meaning of Sweden's NATO accession*. The Strategist. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-meaning-of-swedens-nato-accession/>

<sup>2</sup> G, C. (2024, November 21). *Bring the National Defense Strategy Into Balance* • Stimson Center. Stimson Center. <https://www.stimson.org/2024/bring-the-national-defense-strategy-into-balance/>

threats and discusses them in great detail while involving non-traditional threats for namesake.

## Security Threats Faced by Sweden

The Swedish Defense Sweden has encountered many threats of various natures, such as terrorism, sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, misinformation influenced sabotage, and exploitation of economic dependencies. Illegal intelligence gathering is another concern.<sup>3</sup> The threats can broadly be divided into traditional and non-traditional threats. The Swedish Defense Commission's report states, "The antagonistic threats against Sweden are many and are becoming increasingly complex."<sup>4</sup> This shows that Sweden has recognized that recent times have changed, as the "antagonist" threats have increased, indicating a reference to the Russian threat. Political discussions and diplomatic efforts significantly support Sweden's security and Swedish interests. However, there is a need for improvement in Sweden's capacity to handle crises, threats, and hostile actions that fall below the level of an armed attack.

## Traditional Security Threats

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has made Sweden realize that the lack of a "realism" based approach toward Russia has led to the present situation. As a result, there is a strong indication of a change in Sweden's policy towards Russia in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. The document also acknowledged that "rebuilding national defense capability when a crisis or a war is already a fact has historically proved impossible."<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, Sweden takes a approach, signifying its intent to collaborate with its allies in resisting Russian aggression. This stance, while recognizing the

---

<sup>3</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

need for enhanced domestic defense capacities in the wake of the Crimean annexation, reaffirms Sweden's commitment to multilateral security.

The report also mentions the possibility of a nuclear threat, highlighting the seriousness of the ongoing war. Russia's threshold to use military means has reduced and this is evident as Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier stated, "I want to remind you that our country also has various means of destruction and for separate components and more modern than those of Nato countries."<sup>6</sup>

Sweden understands that Russia's traditional threat will increase further if Russia wins the war against Ukraine; therefore, it has shown determination to continue solid support for Ukraine in the future. Sweden pledged to provide long-term and sustainable support to Ukraine, including assistance in its recovery. Support in various forms, such as humanitarian, political, economic, and military aid, demonstrating its strong commitment. Additional measures such as targeting Russia, including political, financial, and diplomatic actions, have been recommended in response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine and its violations of international law.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, the report highlights Russia's declared strengthening of military presence in Sweden's immediate neighborhood, with a notable rise in the number of units stationed near the Cap of North and Karelia.<sup>8</sup> Lastly, the report clearly states, "The overall conflict between Russia and the West also affects the security situation in the Arctic. It shows the Arctic's military and strategic importance."<sup>9</sup> Strongly indicating that with climate change and ice melting around the Arctic

---

<sup>6</sup> Sauer, Pjotr. "Putin Announces Partial Mobilisation and Threatens Nuclear Retaliation in Escalation of Ukraine War." *The Guardian*, September 22, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/putin-announces-partial-mobilisation-in-russia-in-escalation-of-ukraine-war>.

<sup>7</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-engelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-engelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. "The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023," 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-engelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

region, Russia will have open access toward the Arctic. In the future, Sweden will face the traditional threat from two fronts: the Baltic Sea and the Arctic region.

## Non- Traditional Security Threats

Sweden listed non-tradition threats focusing on China and its support for Russian aggression. Sweden has noted that “China does not pose a direct military threat to Sweden, but it must be stressed that China is challenging Swedish interests and conducting security-threatening activities in and against Sweden.”<sup>10</sup> Research and innovation are the primary targets as the Swedish research institutions are targeted by private Chinese entities and state organizations as part of intelligence operations, making China one of the primary sources of threat.<sup>11</sup>

Sweden also speculates that an emerging Russia-China axis across Eurasia connects European and Asian security. More importantly, the document notes, “China is also challenging global security and the rules-based world order, which could lead to several potentially serious developments.”<sup>12</sup> This could be understood by the Chinese motive to encourage BRICS and SCO as grouping against the West and establishing deep ties with Iran and Russia, both heavily sanctioned nations by the United Nations and the West.

Furthermore, the document mentioned that China and Russia share a similar political model in their nation. Thus, having developed a shared understanding against the democratic model, as the partnership is trying to undermine the efforts of the West, “Russian and Chinese actions undermine democratic governance in other states.”<sup>13</sup> The intelligence threat posed by

---

<sup>10</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> Hellerstedt, Linus. 2023. “Espionage Against Swedish Higher Education Institutions Continues to Increase.” Universitetsläraren. September 8, 2023. <https://universitetslararen.se/2023/03/30/espionage-against-swedish-higher-education-institutions-continues-to-increase/>.

<sup>12</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

disinformation in the age of digitalization and competition for technical know-how was also addressed in the document. It also highlighted China's role in the intelligence threat, as it notes, “China seeks to gain access to technology through strategic acquisitions and investments in digital and physical infrastructure, which can serve both civilian and military purposes.”<sup>14</sup> Lastly, the document also notes that China may use Russia to gain access to the melting Arctic region. This might turn into a traditional threat if China manages to establish a military connection to the region or initiate surveillance around the region, finding loopholes in international laws. This means that China fits into a segment of major non-traditional threats. China's geography and deep engagement in the Indo-Pacific limit its military threat to Europe, but its support for Russia and intelligence espionage of Europe pose significant challenges.

Aside from China, climate change and violent extremism, including right-wing extremism across Europe and Islamic extremism, have been mentioned among the non-traditional threats, which pose short-term and long-term significant threats. In addition, deteriorating security in Africa with external powers competing for the region's resources has also been mentioned. However, there is a notably short mention of these threats, lacking great detail or a solution.

## **NATO Membership and Collective Defense**

Departing from its 200-year-old tradition of neutrality and military non-alignment Sweden seeks to join NATO.<sup>15</sup> The document discussed the NATO prospect in great detail and presented how Sweden's membership in NATO will benefit the rest of the NATO members and Sweden. This indicates that Sweden is looking forward to changing its security architecture in the future. More importantly, Sweden has accepted that preparing for defense alone will be futile; therefore, becoming a part of the NATO security architecture while playing a role in the existing European broader architecture is its best bet for preparing for collective defense. The document also

---

<sup>14</sup> The Defence Commission's Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission's Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Håkansson, Calle, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris). “WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? The Swedish Case.” Journal-article. Edited by Gaspard Schnitzler, 2024. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>.

mentioned Article 5 of NATO and recognized the importance of NATO deterrence, with the U.S. nuclear support in case of an attack, which is integral to Sweden's defense against the traditional threat.

Sweden emphasizes that its NATO membership will strengthen the alliance's ability to achieve its goals and secure the strategically important Baltic and Arctic Seas. Giving NATO the strategic upper hand against Russia. It notes, “NATO’s strategic and operational depth will increase and tie the Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the Baltic Sea regions more closely together from a strategic and operational perspective. Swedish and Finnish territory will become central to the Allies’ defense of Northern Europe and the transatlantic link”.<sup>16</sup>

More importantly, Sweden has highlighted the importance of the Danish Strait and Cap of North in its communication to North America and for the defense of the rest of Europe. This clearly demonstrates Sweden's positioning as an ideal member for the NATO. Sweden has also shown it is preparing to meet NATO standards and is already altering its security policies to be more compatible with NATO. As the document mentions, “Sweden has also committed to participate in the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) on closer European cooperation with the aim of strengthening NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence.”<sup>17</sup>

Sweden has also positioned itself as a nation with efficient armed forces that can withstand harsh cold conditions, which other existing NATO members lack. Other than Sweden's compatibility in the hard military domain, Sweden has also pointed out how it will positively impact the domains of cyberspace, outer space, and NATO's critical infrastructure. The document notes, “The Esrange Space Center, space base is an asset from a defence and security perspective, partly because of the

---

<sup>16</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.



ability to launch satellites and partly because of its geographical proximity to the North Pole and the Arctic region.”<sup>18</sup>

## Sweden’s Geopolitical Approach

Sweden's geopolitical perspective aligns with the broader Western outlook. In the report, Sweden supported the current geopolitical and rules-based world order. Sweden’s foreign policy majorly revolves around the EU. Additionally, Sweden believes the U.S. plays a vital role in European security. Sweden also encouraged building closer relationships with the U.S. and the U.K. alongside the EU and NATO alliances. However, at the same time, it pointed out that Europe needs to take greater responsibility for its defense instead of being dependent on the U.S. given U.S. is overstretched with its resources being allocated in the emerging strategic Indo-Pacific region, which will impact the U.S.'s efficiency in operating in Europe.<sup>19</sup>

The document highlights the importance of the Middle East in the context of energy security. Sweden perceives the Middle East as a dynamic region with reduced U.S. influence. . However, Sweden believes that the Middle East will play a crucial role in Europe's efforts to diversify its energy sources and lessen its reliance on Russia. Therefore, Sweden emphasizes that the Middle East should not be swayed by the Asian markets alone but should also fulfill Europe's needs. This could be further interpreted as Sweden encouraging Europe's independent approach in the Middle East, which may also differ from the U.S. policy.<sup>20</sup>

In the matter of neutral nations, Sweden has listed India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and South Africa among the countries looking to strike a balance in the current divided world.<sup>21</sup> Lastly,

---

<sup>18</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-en-gelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

one of Sweden's statements highlight the importance of the rules-based order and international agreements, “as a security architecture, the European security order offers no protection against the threat from Russia.”<sup>22</sup> It has emphasized that Europe should not compromise its values and international principles since these are central to Swedish foreign and security interests; without them, European security would mean nothing.

## Defense Challenges and Strategic Recommendation

While Sweden has expressed its stance and policy in the white paper, the initiatives and actions undertaken on the ground must also be considered. While Sweden has placed the EU as one of the most crucial to its foreign policy, it is necessary to show action upon the statement. The Swedish political leadership has exhibited some level of doubt or reserved enthusiasm towards the new defense-industrial efforts initiated by the EU in the past few years.<sup>23</sup> Since Sweden is no longer a self-sufficient defense industry as it once was during the Cold War, it is now a niche-oriented defense industry dependent on foreign nations like the U.S. for its defense industry materials and sustaining its defense industry on international exports.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, due to the nature of the Swedish defense industry, a few challenges need to be addressed to follow the security policy outlined in the defense white paper document and tackle the challenges highlighted in its defense white paper.

Due to its current approach to defense cooperation within Europe, Sweden faces several challenges in fully integrating into EU defense frameworks. During the negotiations for the European Defence Fund (EDF), Sweden took a solid stance to protect its defense industry from potential harm by strict third-party conditions, emphasizing the risk of limiting collaboration with non-EU states.

---

<sup>22</sup> The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-engelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> “Sweden and European Defence Cooperation: Interests in Search of a Strategy.” n.d. <https://www.ui.se/english/publications/ui-publications/2018/sweden-and-european-defence-cooperation-interests-in-search-of-a-strategy/>.

<sup>24</sup> Håkansson, Calle, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris). “WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? The Swedish Case.” Journal-article. Edited by Gaspard Schnitzler, 2024. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>.

This successful approach opened opportunities within the EDF and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), revealing disparities between Swedish and broader European defense strategies.<sup>25</sup>

Sweden's strict export controls, particularly concerning intellectual property rights (IPR) and defense equipment, have led to friction with its EU partners. These controls impede joint defense projects and raise concerns about Sweden's reliability in multinational procurement efforts among European allies. Additionally, Sweden's defense planning and acquisition processes must be aligned with the rest of Europe, complicating cooperation on European defense initiatives.

To tackle these challenges, Sweden must take specific steps to enhance coordination between its government, defense industry, and European partners. This involves establishing clear national goals for participation in EU defense initiatives and streamlining internal processes to align with European procedures. Improved collaboration would enable Sweden to participate more effectively in joint projects, such as the EDF, and strengthen its role within PESCO.<sup>26</sup>

Sweden's cautious approach to supranational EU defense mechanisms has created a perception of reluctance to embrace a common European defense strategy. While Sweden has supported initiatives like the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and the European Peace Facility (EPF), it remains cautious about consolidating the European defense market.<sup>27</sup> To promote more excellent compatibility, Sweden must balance national autonomy and the broader objective of European defense integration, supporting competition while contributing to consolidating defense capabilities.

---

<sup>25</sup> Håkansson, Calle, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris). "WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? The Swedish Case." Journal-article. Edited by Gaspard Schnitzler, 2024. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>.

<sup>26</sup> Håkansson, Calle, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris). "WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? The Swedish Case." Journal-article. Edited by Gaspard Schnitzler, 2024. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>.

<sup>27</sup> WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? (2024, February). <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>

By actively addressing these gaps, Sweden can position itself as a more integrated and robust member of the European defense community. This would enhance its security and contribute to the European Union's collective resilience in the face of evolving global threats.

## **Conclusion**

There is a rhythm to this defense strategy—one of tenacity, readiness, and a ferocious will to protect its territory and its core principles. Sweden's position is no longer silent; it speaks with deeds ready to take on the difficulties of an uncertain future. Here, at the beginning of a new era, Sweden's quiet strength becomes a formidable force, ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with its allies and mold the world it imagines a world in which justice is protected with unflinching commitment and peace is guarded with courage.

In conclusion, Sweden's Defense White Paper 2023 marks a transformative phase in the country's security and defense strategy. As Sweden moves towards full NATO membership, it must strengthen its military capabilities, deepen cooperation with European and transatlantic partners, and adapt to traditional and non-traditional security threats. By addressing these challenges, Sweden will enhance its national security and contribute to the stability of the broader Euro-Atlantic region. Sweden will focus on boosting collective defense, safeguarding critical infrastructure, and addressing changing global threats to maintain its status as a significant contributor to European security in the years ahead.

## References

1. Håkansson, Calle, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI), and The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris). “WHAT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INDUSTRIAL BASIS (EDTIB) DO WE WANT/NEED? The Swedish Case.” Journal-article. Edited by Gaspard Schnitzler, 2024. <https://www.irisfrance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2024/02/ARES-92-Comment.pdf>.
2. Hellerstedt, Linus. 2023. “Espionage Against Swedish Higher Education Institutions Continues to Increase.” *Universitetsläraaren*. September 8, 2023. <https://universitetslararen.se/2023/03/30/espionage-against-swedish-higher-education-institutions-continues-to-increase>
3. Sauer, Pjotr. “Putin Announces Partial Mobilisation and Threatens Nuclear Retaliation in Escalation of Ukraine War.” *The Guardian*, September 22, 2022. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/21/putin-announces-partial-mobilisation-in-russia-in-escalation-of-ukraine-war>
4. “Sweden and European Defence Cooperation: Interests in Search of a Strategy.” n.d. <https://www.ui.se/english/publications/ui-publications/2018/sweden-and-european-defence-cooperation-interests-in-search-of-a-strategy/>
5. The Defence Commission’s Secretariat. “The Swedish Defence Commission’s Report on Security Policy, 2023,” 2023. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/de808e940116476d8252160c58b78bb7/sammandrag-pa-engelska-av-allvarstid-ds-202319.pdf>.