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DEFENCE WHITE PAPER PROJECT

The Long -Term Perspective
for Defence 2035
Czech Republic

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Introduction

The Long-Term Defence Perspective 2035 highlights the essential elements and approaches for the defence sector's long-term development in order to achieve the Czech Republic's political-military aspirations and international commitments. The future development of the Czech armed forces is steered by the deteriorating security environment, which is expected to deteriorate further in the next 10-15 years.¹ These changes make it obvious that the Czech armed forces must be highly mobile, staffed with highly trained and skilled personnel, equipped with advanced systems, stocked with ample supplies of materiel, and develop compatibility with their Allies.

The Czech Republic's defence policy is based on its participation in both NATO and the EU. The participation gives the state the benefit of collective defence and security while also committing it to contribute adequately to collective defence.² The Long-Term Defence Perspective 2035 is based on the Czech Republic's key laws, strategies, and policy papers, as well as NATO and EU security and military policies. This defence document is used as a reference for defence planning, especially in the development of five-year mid-term plans. It specifies the essential directions for military capability development and provides guidelines for the periodic evaluation of the "Concept of the Czech Armed Forces Development," and other conceptual documents, based on an examination of developments in the strategic environment.³ The document duly considers the fact that the security environment is not only deteriorating because of the redistribution of power dynamics globally but also focuses on the ever-evolving nature of this space. It greatly focuses on the advancements in science and technology and the evolving mode of warfare; "hybrid warfare," in which cyber threats and other highly effective non-military soft capabilities play a major role. In order to function successfully in cyberspace, make full use of unmanned and autonomous systems, or deploy artificial intelligence, the Czech Republic aims at closely tracking the scientific and technological breakthroughs and making adequate upgrades in its capacity relentlessly.

¹ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "4". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

² ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "6". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

³ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "6-7". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

This document has defined a realistic framework in order to achieve the necessary capabilities that are required to meet the Czech Republic's political-military aspirations as well as its obligations towards allies and partners in lieu of the evolving security structure.

Summary

The Czech Republic's defence policy is based on its membership in NATO and the European Union. The state benefits from collective defence and security as a result of its involvement, but it also commits to contribute sufficiently to collective defence. The Czech Republic protects its sovereignty and territorial integrity first and foremost under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which defines collective defence.⁴ However, membership in international organisations absolves the Czech Republic of main responsibility for its own defence. As a result, the Czech Republic continues to improve its potential to resist armed attack, both independently and in collaboration with other governments.

A deteriorating security environment-

The security environment will continue to change in all aspects, most notably with regards to the global redistribution and diffusion of economic, political, and military power.⁵ Around the world, the distribution of political authority, economic potential, and military might remain diversified and imbalanced. Outside of NATO and the EU, important regional entities continue to improve their military capabilities. There are ambitious states that are willing to use force and break international law in order to achieve their goals and pursue power politics. As a result, the prospect of a direct or indirect military engagement involving the Czech Republic cannot be ruled out.⁶ The current tensions between European states and Russia, sparked by

⁴ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "6". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

⁵ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "8-9". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

⁶ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "9". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

explicit Russian aggression against some governments, are the major source of risk in Europe. Russia conducts a wide range of hybrid efforts against NATO and EU member nations, including targeted disinformation and cyber-attacks.

These continuous changes will almost certainly include fundamental strategy shifts, such as the changing importance of various players, their basic interests, and the instruments for promoting their interests on a global, regional, and local scale. The security environment will grow increasingly complicated, both at the level of actors and in terms of threat structure, as a result of the use of hybrid techniques. The primary goal of which is to reduce the cost of accomplishing desired effects through highly effective non-military "soft" capabilities.⁷ Hybrid campaigns use a variety of military and civilian tools, such as economic pressure, deception, and propaganda. The goal of these strategies is to attain political objectives in a foreign country without resorting to open international aggression. Non-state entities such as terrorist and paramilitary groups, organised crime, and private military firms will gain more power and autonomy. Terrorism will continue to be utilised as a coercive tool to achieve political objectives.

Conflicts will arise as a result of ongoing economic and information globalisation, climatic change, and unequal technological and demographic advancements, all of which may have a substantial impact on the strategic objectives of geographically distant players. Increased mobility combined with a dense population will raise the likelihood of infectious illnesses spreading, including some with pandemic potential. Modern information and communication technologies, such as the internet and the speed with which social media disseminates tensions and instability, are allowing tensions and instability to be transferred. These techniques can be employed on an unprecedented scale for information and psychological operations. Aggressors are more inclined to use hybrid means rather than openly using conventional armed forces to achieve their political goals. Modern societies' growing reliance on information technologies makes cyber security a critical concern for governments and the services they provide, especially the defence sector. A variety of state and non-state entities are developing offensive cyber capabilities to attack both state and non-state institutions' digital systems and vital infrastructure.⁸ The difficulty in identifying cyber-attackers diminishes our ability to dissuade them while simultaneously increasing the possibility of erroneous attribution.

⁷ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "8". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

⁸ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "12". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

Although in the 2035 horizon, the likelihood of a direct military strike on Czech Republic territory remains low, it is impossible to rule out the potential that other nations to whom the Czech Republic is obliged by defence treaty duties will be attacked in some form. A confrontation, especially one of a military type, that would pose a substantial threat to the Czech Republic's security might arise unexpectedly and without notice.⁹

The Czech Armed Forces Development

Unconventional and inventive approaches must be used alongside established approaches when determining how to supply the requisite capabilities. Within the human – equipment – operational environment framework, the potential for innovation should be explored in order to make game-changing enhancements to military capability.¹⁰ Czech Republic must expect new sorts of conflict, as well as the use of non-traditional weapons, given the rapid speed of scientific and technological advancements. The capacity to work successfully in cyberspace is becoming increasingly important. Unmanned and autonomous systems, robotics, electronics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, composite materials, and other emerging and disruptive technologies are being adapted for military purposes, and the Armed Forces must make the best use of them to maintain their competitive advantage.¹¹ The Armed Forces' capabilities development and operational use both necessitate significant and complicated information support. In collaboration with Military Intelligence and its national civilian and international (NATO, EU) partner agencies, the different approaches to provide this important support will be further developed.¹² Intelligence and information support will feed into the Armed Forces' command and control system first and foremost and should be able to operate in any situation. The Armed Forces'

⁹ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "11". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹⁰ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "15-16". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹¹ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "17". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹² ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "18-19". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

command and control structure will be developed as a three-layer structure to provide joint, permanent, reliable, and swift command and control in operations, capable of commanding multinational forces while still being able to carry out regular tasks on home territory. Personnel assigned to national headquarters and staffs will circulate between NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) headquarters' international staffs.¹³ For today's and future operations, complex real-time situational awareness of a specific area is critical. As a result, ground and airborne reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities will be developed both domestically and through Alliance programmes that cover the entire ISTAR architecture up to strategic assets. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence will continue to develop specific capabilities such as monitoring the CBRN situation, managing the consequences of CBRN assaults or catastrophes, and protecting forces and assets in contaminated areas.¹⁴ Continuous development of reconnaissance capability based on primary 3D radars and passive surveillance systems, advanced command and control systems, ground-based air defence systems, and subsonic and supersonic aircraft will be required to ensure the security of national airspace. Participation in NATINAMDS and the provision of assets for the National Reinforcement System for Air Defence will be the minimum requirements for the national air defence posture.¹⁵

Cyberspace's importance as a domain of the future security environment will continue to expand. As a result, capabilities, and tools for the complete range of cyber operations must be developed. Close cooperation with Military Intelligence will concern not only the Czech Armed Forces' cyber security and cyber defence but also the development of capacities for active complex cyber operations.¹⁶

¹³ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "19". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹⁴ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "19-20". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹⁵ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "20-22". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹⁶ ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "22". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

Analysis

In order to survive in the evolving security space, the Czech Republic needs to develop a comprehensive approach – the ability of all military branches and services to execute coordinated joint operations including intelligence, military, and civilian elements on traditional battlefields, as well as in cyberspace and information environments. They will need to develop intelligence, planning, and decision-making processes that are faster and more effective as part of the armed forces strategic and operational command and control. Armed forces need to be robust and resilient, with the ability to deploy quickly, including at a strategic distance along with increased force flexibility, preparedness, and mobility in terms of manpower, equipment, and materiel stocks and training. NATO and the EU's increased responsiveness and international collaboration, particularly their ability to conduct large-scale multinational operations at the corps level.¹⁷ Overall societal resilience, enough resources, competent civil contingency planning, proactive strategic communications, and so on are all part of an integrated strategy for security and defence. National legislation needs to be amended to enable for adequate responses to new challenges and requirements.

Czech Republic's long-term defence planning is a combination of multi-layered approaches that use a combination of overlapping strategies that will help the state strengthen its long-term defence architecture. A top-down planning approach has helped in identifying the top-level interests which aim at developing the Czech armed forces and strengthening security ties with a multilateral platform like NATO and the EU. The Czech Republic has focused on developing its capabilities during peacetime in order to be ready if a crisis emerges.

In terms of resource planning the availability of appropriate resources on a constant basis is a necessary condition for an effective national defence. Sufficient funding will enable efficient long-term planning of material, human, and financial resources – the foundations for providing national defence and security, growing the Armed Forces, and meeting our NATO and EU commitments.¹⁸ The defence budget aims towards gradually attain and sustain a level of 2% of GDP by 2024 in order to complete critical modernization projects, acquire essential stockpiles of military materiel, and pay expenses for retention and

¹⁷ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "13-14". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

¹⁸ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "25-26". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

recruitment of military personnel.¹⁹ This is at the heart of the promise made by the Czech Republic and all other NATO Allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. Another guiding principle that supports adequate defence capability development is allocating 20% of defence spending to the acquisition or upgrading of major equipment, including related R&D. It's also critical to keep staff costs under 50 per cent of the overall defence budget.²⁰

Given the changing security and operating environments, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive, transparent, and effective acquisition system that allows for the coordinated acquisition of military equipment and materiel while adhering to required timelines and quality standards; at a reasonable cost; ensuring adequate supply security, and supporting the development of the Czech defence industry. The system's new configuration will emphasise speeding up and improving the efficiency of acquisition procedures.

Lastly, for the scenario and threat-based planning, the Czech defence document has identified issues of open Russian aggression towards many European nations which include hybrid warfare methods including cyber-attacks which the paper has addressed in great lengths. Also, security threats posed by climate change, failed states and international immigration and the refugee crisis are also highlighted in the document which poses further threats to the European nations specifically because Europe is the destination for the majority of the migrants. This is another major threat that the Czech Republic has to deal with.

Conclusion

The Long-Term Perspective was created to address the trends and challenges that would emerge in the year 2035. After four years, this document was to be revisited but considering the major global disruptions over the past two years, the document will have to be revisited sooner as the current geo-political events have had substantial repercussions for majority of the nation states. Over the past two years, the world has been

¹⁹ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "25". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

²⁰ŠIMŮNEK, Petr. 2022. "25-26". *Army.Cz*. <https://www.army.cz/assets/en/ministry-of-defence/basic-documents/dv-2035-aj.pdf>.

living under the brutal brunt of the COVID-19 pandemic which has negatively hit almost all nations in economic and social terms. Despite the fact that the defence document did highlight the potential of a pandemic breaking out in the near future, no state was prepared for the same.

The pandemic was followed by the US pullout from Afghanistan which led to the Taliban taking over the country and leaving greater central Asia under uncertainty and security turmoil. To add to the troubles, Russia (in what is called a special military operation) launched a full-scale military attack on Ukraine creating a major security lapse in entire Europe. The Russian threat that the document talked about broke out in reality and resurfaced the fragility of the global security structure.

The failure of handling the pandemic, the American failure in Afghanistan along with the helplessness of NATO and the EU in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine crisis have left a major power void in the world. States like China that have the potential along with the economic might will try to fulfil this gap as the American and the western hegemony is in a decline.

The Czech Republic which is a part of this declining hegemonic bloc (NATO and EU) will have to rethink its long-term defence perspective based on the unfolding of global events. Their dependency on Russian military equipment which they aimed to reduce by 2035 will now be stopped immediately. The Czech Republic will have to work more closely with the EU and NATO in order to restrengthen and rebuild the multilateral security architecture while protecting and advancing its defence equipment. The world has become a more complex space, especially over the past two years, the nature of defence not only for the Czech Republic but for the majority of the states has become a very difficult affair to predict. The complexities are increasing with each passing day hence, the success of European integration and a strong transatlantic relationship is essential for Europe's long-term security, stability, and prosperity.

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